Imputación objetiva y Administración pública
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Publication date
2022
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Aranzadi La Ley
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Abstract
El presente estudio pretende desentrañar el juego que ha tenido –y que podría llegar a tener razonablemente– la denominada teoría de la imputación objetiva dentro del sistema de responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas. A tal efecto, sistematizo primero una variedad de reglas que conciernen al nexo causal, evidenciado hasta qué punto la causalidad es una cuestión estrictamente jurídica. Ello permitirá después exponer sintéticamente y valorar críticamente la teoría de la imputación objetiva, tal como se ha desarrollado en el marco del Derecho civil. Situados ya en el ámbito de la responsabilidad patrimonial, comoquiera que el análisis precedente arroja una estrecha relación entre la teoría de la culpa y la teoría de la imputación objetiva, se hace aún imprescindible una reflexión previa sobre los orígenes, consolidación y crisis del conocido dogma panobjetivista dominante en la jurisprudencia contencioso-administrativa. Sobre estas bases explico y valoro críticamente al fin el desarrollo de la imputación objetiva en el ámbito del Derecho administrativo, tal como se ha planteado y como, a mi modo de ver, habría de replantearse. Una primera conclusión es que la teoría de la imputación objetiva ha operado como “contrabalance técnico” al sistema de pura objetividad y, más precisamente, como forma de introducir enmascaradamente la exigencia de culpa. La segunda conclusión es que, si se admite abiertamente que la culpa no es ajena al sistema de responsabilidad patrimonial, una teoría de la imputación objetiva adecuadamente dimensionada podría ofrecer pautas útiles para resolver el tradicional problema del eterno encadenamiento de causas y efectos. Ahora bien, algunos de sus criterios deberían estudiarse cabalmente dentro de las teorías de la causalidad empírica, por un lado, y de la culpa o anormalidad del funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, por otro. Además, la imputación objetiva, no solo no agota las quaestiones iuris relacionadas con el nexo causal, sino que las reglas que acierta a justificar son menos importantes que las pertenecientes a la teoría de la causalidad empírica en términos tanto cualitativos como cuantitativos.
This essay explains the theory of objective imputation (Objektive Zurechnung) as it has been -or could be- developed within the law of liability of public administrations in Spain. To this end, I first systematize a variety of rules that concern causation in fact, showing to what extent this is a strictly legal matter. This will allow us to expose synthetically and critically assess the theory of objective imputation, as it has been developed within the framework of private law. Located in the field of State liability, since the preceding analysis reveals a clase relationship between the theory of negligence and the theory of objective imputation, a prior reflection on the origins, consolidation and crisis of the widely used among judges pan-objectivist dogma is still essentíal. On these bases, I explain and critically assess the development of objective imputation in the field of Adminístrative Law, as it has been proposed and how, in my opinion, it should be reconsidered. A first conclusión is that the theory of objective imputation has operated as a "technical counterbalance" to the system of pure strict liability and, more precísely, as a way of masking the demand for negligence. The second conclusion is that, if it is openly admitted that fault is not alien to the system of governmental liability, a properly dimensioned theory of objective imputation could offer useful guidelines to solve the traditional problem of the eternal chain of causes and effects. However, some of its criteria should be thoroughly studied within the theories of causation in fact. on the one hand, and fault or abnormality in the functioning of public services on the other. In addition, objective imputation not only does not exhaust the quaestiones iuris related to causation, but the rules that it manages to justify are less important than those belonging to the theory of causation in fact in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
This essay explains the theory of objective imputation (Objektive Zurechnung) as it has been -or could be- developed within the law of liability of public administrations in Spain. To this end, I first systematize a variety of rules that concern causation in fact, showing to what extent this is a strictly legal matter. This will allow us to expose synthetically and critically assess the theory of objective imputation, as it has been developed within the framework of private law. Located in the field of State liability, since the preceding analysis reveals a clase relationship between the theory of negligence and the theory of objective imputation, a prior reflection on the origins, consolidation and crisis of the widely used among judges pan-objectivist dogma is still essentíal. On these bases, I explain and critically assess the development of objective imputation in the field of Adminístrative Law, as it has been proposed and how, in my opinion, it should be reconsidered. A first conclusión is that the theory of objective imputation has operated as a "technical counterbalance" to the system of pure strict liability and, more precísely, as a way of masking the demand for negligence. The second conclusion is that, if it is openly admitted that fault is not alien to the system of governmental liability, a properly dimensioned theory of objective imputation could offer useful guidelines to solve the traditional problem of the eternal chain of causes and effects. However, some of its criteria should be thoroughly studied within the theories of causation in fact. on the one hand, and fault or abnormality in the functioning of public services on the other. In addition, objective imputation not only does not exhaust the quaestiones iuris related to causation, but the rules that it manages to justify are less important than those belonging to the theory of causation in fact in both qualitative and quantitative terms.