Did the ancient greeks know the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments? Discussion of a question posed in the Aetas Kantiana

Abstract

In a 1793 essay, J. Ch. Schwab claimed that Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments was already known to the Megarian philosopher Stilpo. Schwab's essay was criticised as early as 1794 by J. F. Ch. Gräffe. In a 1789 essay, J. A. Eberhard had also denied the originality of Kant's division of judgments and made certain indications suggesting that Aristotle was aware of the distinction. In this paper, I propose a fresh examination of why Schwab is wrong to attribute knowledge of Kant's division of judgments to Stilpo – a second look which, however, does not disregard Gräffe's contributions to the discussion. Second, I argue that, in a precise sense, Kant's division of judgments is indeed original, but that the analytic – synthetic distinction was nevertheless in a sense known to Aristotle. The assessment of these alleged precedents sheds light no only on the novelty of Kant's philosophical project but also on what may be called the "the paradox of the discovery of an evident philosophical distinction".