Disrupting the game: ordinary language and situated action

Abstract

So-called ‘ordinary language philosophy’ (OLP) emerged in the 1930s at the University of Cambridge and reached its maximum splendour in the philosophical context of Oxford, after the Second World War. That is why it is sometimes called the ‘Oxford Philosophy’, although it has been simultaneously implemented in both universities, in ‘Oxbridge’. Despite lacking a distinctive name1(cf. Pears 1966), the ‘family resemblance’ – in Wittgenstein’s terms (cf. 1986: 67) – stands out among its representatives due to the way in which they do philosophy. In the context of the so-called true ‘Revolution in philosophy’ (Ayer 1956), we encounter a composite nominal landscape shaped primarily by prominent and diverse philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, John L. Austin, Geoffrey Warnock, Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire, Richard Hare, David Pears, Henry Price, Peter Strawson, Paul Grice, etc. Following Wittgenstein’s powerful analogy between language and game, it should be noted that the different OLP games shared not only a context (pre-war, war and post-war England) but also a research activity on how words are used in ordinary practice, since it is in that use where philosophical confusions arise.