El impacto de la ayuda internacional en la calidad de las instituciones
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2010
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Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI)
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Abstract
Diversos trabajos han puesto de manifiesto que la ayuda al desarrollo puede tener un efecto perverso sobre la calidad institucional de los países que la reciben, dando lugar a una especie de maldición de la ayuda. En opinión de los autores, sin embargo, esta literatura muestra dos graves deficiencias. En primer lugar, en ninguno de los trabajos se efectúa una investigación previa sobre los determinantes de la calidad institucional, lo que da lugar a un importante problema de variables omitidas. En segundo lugar, no se contempla la posibilidad de que existan rendimientos decrecientes en la ayuda. El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en corregir estas dos deficiencias a través de una estimación propia, obteniendo como conclusión fundamental que, una vez que se controla por los determinantes de la calidad institucional, la ayuda incide en esta variable de forma positiva, pero con rendimientos decrecientes.
Some empirical works have argued that aid hinders the institutional quality of recipient countries. This article argues that these works suffer from two main shortcomings that make their conclusions less tenable. On the one hand, a previous investigation of the determinants of institutional quality is usually not implemented, and as a consequence, a serious omitted variables problem emerges. On the other hand, aid may show decreasing returns, but this possibility is rarely taken into account. At the aim of overcoming these shortcomings, the article presents a new estimation of an institutional quality equation that incorporates its main determinants as well as aid. Its main results suggest that aid impacts positively on institutional quality, but it shows decreasing returns.
Some empirical works have argued that aid hinders the institutional quality of recipient countries. This article argues that these works suffer from two main shortcomings that make their conclusions less tenable. On the one hand, a previous investigation of the determinants of institutional quality is usually not implemented, and as a consequence, a serious omitted variables problem emerges. On the other hand, aid may show decreasing returns, but this possibility is rarely taken into account. At the aim of overcoming these shortcomings, the article presents a new estimation of an institutional quality equation that incorporates its main determinants as well as aid. Its main results suggest that aid impacts positively on institutional quality, but it shows decreasing returns.