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Teoría de la elección pública: últimas lineas de investigación

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1988
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
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El objetivo de este trabajo se centra en el estudio de las principales aportaciones y corrientes investigadoras actuales de la elección pública positiva. Se expone, en primer lugar, una breve reseña de las principales aportaciones de la elección pública positiva. En segundo lugar, las líneas de investigación recientes. En tercer lugar trabajos de contrastación empírica de las teorías de la Públic Choice realizadas también recientemente. Y en cuarto y último lugar, las aportaciones teóricas y empíricas que sobre esta materia se han realizado en España.
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(1.984), "Theory of Public Choice", II, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. BUCHANAN, J.M. y TULLOCK, G. (1.962), "The calculus of consent", Logical Foundations of constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor. BUCHANAN, J.M. y VANBERG, V.J. (1.988), "The politicization of market failure", Public Choice, nº. 57, pp. 101-113. BUCHANAN, J.M. y Wagner, R. (1.977), "Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of lord Keynes", Academic Press, Nueva York. (V.C. en Rialp, Madrid, 1.983). BURDEN, G. Y GAYNOR, P. (1.987), "The rational behavior theory of voting participation. Evidence from the 1.970 and 1.982 elections", Public Choice. CALLE, R. (1.986), "Los fallos del sector público", Hacienda Pública Española, nº 100, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, pp. 231-255. CASAHUGA, A.: "Contribución a la sección de documentos de Hacienda Pública Espñola, números 46, 47, 48, 50, 56 Y 60. CASAHUGA, A. (1.978), "Hacia una teoría económica de la burocracia", Hacienda Pública Española, nº. 52, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. CASAHUGA, A. (1.979), "Aproximaciones normativas modernas a la reforma tributaria", Hacienda Pública Española, nº. 56, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. CASAHUGA, A. (1.984), "Teoría de la Hacienda Pública Democrática", Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. CASAHUGA, A. (1.985), "Fundamentos normativos de la acción y organización social", Barcelona, Ariel. CEBULA, B.J. (1.985), "New evidence on financial crowding out", Public Choice, nº. 46, pp. 305-309. CEBULA, B.J. (1.987), "Federal deficits and the real rate interest in USA: A note", Public Choice nº. 53, pp. 97-100. CEBULA ,R. y KAFOGLIS, M. (1,983), "In search of optimum relativa unanumity", Public Choice, nº. 40 pp. 195-201. CEBULA ,R. y KAFOGLIS, M. (1.986), "A note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis: The period 1.975-1.980", Public Choice, nº. 48, pp. 65-69. CEBULA, R. y LESLIE, K. 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