The Nest Structure of Our Belief System and Its Consequences

Abstract

In this paper I shall develop the picture of the human belief system contained in the nest metaphor that Wittgenstein uses in On Certainty (OC: 225) and how this metaphor is related with general problems in the theory of knowledge. I shall also show how this simile basically agrees with many observations that appear in this and other works, and explore the main consequences of considering our system of beliefs like a nest. I argue that human belief systems include a plurality of hinges that work at different levels and which might be regulated by different rules of grammar. However, this kind of structure might have problems of consistency. Thus, it is important to think about how such a nest structure could react to changes that are prompted by new beliefs that need to be incorporated in it. Such changes might issue not only in the replacement of some beliefs by others, but also in the re-shaping of the whole structure. If this is the case, then new elements should be added to the nest metaphor to portrait human belief systems more accurately. Along with these reflections, I shall critically engage various points of Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretation of On Certainty