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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

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dc.contributor.authorCabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorLugo Arocha, Haydeé Corina
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-20T09:12:47Z
dc.date.available2023-06-20T09:12:47Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.description.facultyInstituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.description.refereedFALSE
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grants CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
dc.description.statusunpub
dc.eprint.idhttps://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/12474
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://www.ucm.es/icae
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48979
dc.issue.number05
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.total14
dc.publisherInstituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.relation.projectIDECO2009-10531
dc.relation.projectIDECO2010-19596
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/
dc.subject.jelD64
dc.subject.jelH21
dc.subject.jelH41
dc.subject.keywordLotteries
dc.subject.keywordPublic good
dc.subject.keywordWarm glow
dc.subject.keywordEficiency
dc.subject.ucmFinanzas
dc.subject.ucmEconomía pública
dc.titleAn impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
dc.typetechnical report
dc.volume.number2011
dcterms.referencesAndreoni, J. (1989): "Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1447-1458. Andreoni, J. (1990): "Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving?," Economic Journal, 100(4), 464-477. Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian (1986): "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, 29, 25-49. Bergstrom, T., and R. Cornes (1983): "Independence of allocative eficiency from distribution in the theory of public goods," Econometrica, 51(6), 1753-1765. Borg, M. O., and P. M. Mason (1988): "The Budgetary Incidence of a Lottery to Support Education," National Tax Journal, 61, 75-85. Borg, M. O., P. M. Mason, and S. L. Shapiro (1991): The economic consequences of state lotteries. Praeger Press, New York, NY. Buchanan, J. (1963): "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, 71, 457-469. Clotfelter, C. T., and P. P. Cook (1989): Selling hope, State lotteries in America. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Morgan, J. (2000): "Financing public goods by means of lotteries," The Review of Economic Studies, 67(4), 761-784. Temimi, A. (2001): "Does altruism mitigate free-riding and welfare loss?,"Economics Bulletin, 8(5), 1-8.
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication893acf3a-d00d-4165-89f1-74fe5ad70ae1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery893acf3a-d00d-4165-89f1-74fe5ad70ae1

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