Kant's emotional normativity and the embodiment of reason: Interests, reflection and feelings

Abstract

This contribution aims to provide an over view of the image of human epistemic and practical agency drawn by reason, aesthetic reflection, and moral feeling, especiallywithin the context of the "emotional turn" that research on Kant's philosophy has undergone in recent decades. This chapter will first point out that reason does not lead the subject to adopt feelings that foster their own happiness, but rather, motivates the individual to seek a theoretical grounding in epistemology.Second, I shall highlight that the reflexion on judgment acquaints the subject with an emotional state that allows her to disregard her ownegoistic inclinations and attune her views and judgments with those of others. Finally, Iwill analyze the fact that, in Kant's view, certain feelings should be cultivated as away of attaining moral strength and thus becoming better able to both control temporary mental disorders while also progressively overcoming human frailty of will.