A partisan explanation of political monetary cycles

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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
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This paper develops a political monetary model based on partisanship and commitment arguments that explains the likely existence of expansionary monetary policy in pre-election periods irrespective of the incumbent party and of permanent partisan differences in monetary policy. The approach taken is to incorporate the option that political parties elaborate electoral economic programs into a rational partisan electoral model. Our results are consistent with the recent empírical findings of Alesina, Cahen, and Roubini (1992, 1993) for a sample including three decades in 18 OECD economies but without relying on opportinistic governmental behavior.
Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo político de la conducción de la política monetaria basado en argumentos de partidismo y compromiso vinculante que explica la probable existencia de políticas monetarias expansivas en periodos preelectorales así como la de diferencias partidistas en la conducción monetaria. La idea consiste en incorporar a un modelo electoral partidista y racional la opción de que los partidos políticos presenten al electorado un programa económico electoral. Las conclusiones del modelo son consistentes con los recientes resultados empíricos de Alesina, Cohen y Roubini (1992, 1993) para una muestra de 18 países de la OCDE durante tres décadas pero sin tener que utilizar el supuesto de comportamiento oportunista por parte de los gobiernos.
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