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A common mistake on weakness of will

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2013

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González-Castán, Óscar L. (2013). “A Common Mistake on Weakness of Will”, in Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 44, pp. 27-31.

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In this paper I propose the sketch of an explanatory model to deal with cases of weakness of will that has some advantages in comparison with other well-known and influential theories. The main thesis of this model, of classical inspiration, is that the weak-willed agent should be portrayed as someone who has a sort of divided self. The development of this idea will allow us to place back desire to the central stage in the explanation of this phenomenon. According to this model we do not need to give up the idea that the agent forms and maintains an unconditional intention of doing the action that he finally fails to do, as Davidson’s epistemic version of the phenomenon proposes, but we do no need to rely on the idea that there is a causal gap between intentions and actions, as Searle’s ontological version of it makes us think.

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