Second order beliefs and second order controversies: justification and normativity

Abstract

There is a quite relevant aspect for philosophical discussion that, nevertheless, recent literature on controversies does not deal with properly, i.e., the problem of second order controversies. These are controversies that the contending parties establish about the meaning of a set of first order beliefs and theories once they are generally accepted by the participants. A historical example of this kind of second order controversies is the classical discussion between “instrumentalists” and “realistic” interpretations of Copernicus’ theories. What is at stake in second order controversies is the general structure and dynamics of our belief system and not so much its particular semantic contents. These second order controversies have two different normative implications. On the one hand, they provide ideas about how our belief system should be compartmentalized, for example, whether or not religious and scientific beliefs should have some interesting inferential relationships. On the other hand, they give further motives to cognitively evaluate first order beliefs.