Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer

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dc.contributor.authorDavia, Cory
dc.contributor.authorPalmira, Michele
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-10T09:58:19Z
dc.date.available2026-02-10T09:58:19Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.descriptionThe second author’s research was supported by the project PRIN (Progetti di Ricerca di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale) "Realismo e Oggettivita" (20107738C5_007) and by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Centre de Recherche en Ethique and the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativite (GRIN).
dc.description.abstractDeference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
dc.description.departmentDepto. de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica
dc.description.facultyFac. de Filosofía
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.sponsorshipCentre de Recherche en Ethique (Montreal)
dc.description.sponsorshipMinistero dell'Università e della Ricerca (Italia)
dc.description.sponsorshipFonds de recherche du Québec
dc.description.statuspub
dc.identifier.citationDavia, C., & Palmira, M. (2015). Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 605-625. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014
dc.identifier.essn1467-9213
dc.identifier.issn0031-8094
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/65/261/605/1505308
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/61fa8afc565bff40e6e7c327
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/132007
dc.issue.number261
dc.journal.titleThe Philosophical Quarterly
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final625
dc.page.initial605
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.rights.accessRightsrestricted access
dc.subject.cdu1
dc.subject.cdu17
dc.subject.keywordMoral Deference
dc.subject.keywordExpertise
dc.subject.keywordEpistemic Parity
dc.subject.keywordObjectivity
dc.subject.keywordRealism
dc.subject.keywordConstructivism
dc.subject.ucmFilosofía
dc.subject.ucmÉtica
dc.subject.unesco7203 Filosofía General
dc.titleMoral deference and deference to an epistemic peer
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dc.volume.number65
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationd6b05c01-95dd-45ee-9cf1-049a3408dcbc
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryd6b05c01-95dd-45ee-9cf1-049a3408dcbc

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