Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer
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2015
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Oxford University Press
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Davia, C., & Palmira, M. (2015). Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 605-625. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014
Abstract
Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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The second author’s research was supported by the project PRIN (Progetti di Ricerca di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale) "Realismo e Oggettivita" (20107738C5_007) and by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Centre de Recherche en Ethique and the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativite (GRIN).