Publication:
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics

dc.contributor.authorRodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
dc.contributor.authorRomero Medina, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-17T12:24:10Z
dc.date.available2023-06-17T12:24:10Z
dc.date.issued2020-07
dc.descriptionFirst Version: July 27, 2020 This Version: August 3, 2022
dc.description.abstractWe consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transfer-able student characteristics. In this framework, the tradeoff between efficiency and stability can be alleviated by forming fair Pareto improvements where a group of students may improve their assignment to schools by exchanging their positions and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned to without generating justified envy for the remaining students. We define the student exchange with transferable characteristics (SETC) class of algorithms. Every algorithm in the SETC class starts from an initial matching of students to schools and an initial allocation of transferable characteristics and proposes a sequence of fair Pareto improvements, until the point at which an additional efficiency gain implies a violation of the school priorities that cannot be solved with a reallocation of transferable characteristics.
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.description.facultyInstituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.statuspub
dc.eprint.idhttps://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/61990
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dc.identifier.issn2341-2356
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://www.ucm.es/icae
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11855
dc.issue.number04
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.total30
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD61
dc.subject.jelD78
dc.subject.jelI20
dc.subject.keywordSchool Choice
dc.subject.keywordTransferable Characteristics
dc.subject.keywordPriorities
dc.subject.keywordConstrained Efficiency.
dc.subject.ucmEconometría (Economía)
dc.subject.unesco5302 Econometría
dc.titleSchool Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics
dc.typetechnical report
dc.volume.number2020
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4b4dbd38-bad9-401f-ad44-455383770a5a
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4b4dbd38-bad9-401f-ad44-455383770a5a
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