Repensar el significado. Variaciones sobre Peirce y Wittgenstein
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2020
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Este trabajo es una reflexión teórica sobre el significar (representar o comunicar), inspirada en conversaciones previas con Wenceslao Castañares. Siguiendo una cadena de variaciones sobre propuestas de Peirce, Wittgenstein y sus continuadores, se argumenta que, para situar el ‘interpretante’ como clave de la semiosis no se puede pivotar sobre lo subjetivo-mental ni excluirlo, sino que hay que remitirse a la normatividad sociocultural, encarnada como hábito. Pero, si no queremos caer en una paradoja, esta normatividad ha de venir sostenida por criterios públicos para su aplicación y por condiciones prácticas, interactivas y materiales muy generales e implícitas, pero semióticamente activas. El significar (la semiosis) es, por ello, un proceso continuo e interno al despliegue de la existencia, donde se constituye conjuntamente con subjetividades y objetualidades.
This text is a theoretical reflection on meaning (to represent or communicate), inspired by previous conversations with Wenceslao Castañares. Following a chain of variations on proposals by Peirce, Wittgenstein, and their followers, it is argued that, to position the ‘interpreter’ as the key to semiosis, one cannot pivot on the subjective-mental nor exclude it, but must refer to sociocultural regulations, embodied as a habit. But, if we do not want to fall into a paradox, this regulations must be supported by public criteria for its application and by very general and implicit, but semiotically active, practical, interactive and material conditions. Meaning (semiosis) is, therefore, a continuous process, internal to the unfolding of existence, and it is jointly constituted with subjectivities and objectualities.
This text is a theoretical reflection on meaning (to represent or communicate), inspired by previous conversations with Wenceslao Castañares. Following a chain of variations on proposals by Peirce, Wittgenstein, and their followers, it is argued that, to position the ‘interpreter’ as the key to semiosis, one cannot pivot on the subjective-mental nor exclude it, but must refer to sociocultural regulations, embodied as a habit. But, if we do not want to fall into a paradox, this regulations must be supported by public criteria for its application and by very general and implicit, but semiotically active, practical, interactive and material conditions. Meaning (semiosis) is, therefore, a continuous process, internal to the unfolding of existence, and it is jointly constituted with subjectivities and objectualities.