Market power in California's water market

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dc.contributor.authorTomori, Françeska
dc.contributor.authorAnsink, Erik
dc.contributor.authorHouba, Harold
dc.contributor.authorHagerty, Nick
dc.contributor.authorBos, Charles
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-19T09:20:14Z
dc.date.available2026-03-19T09:20:14Z
dc.date.issued2023-10-28
dc.description.abstractWe estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
dc.description.departmentDepto. de Análisis Económico y Economía Cuantitativa
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversitat Rovira i Virgili
dc.description.sponsorshipGeneralitat de Catalunya
dc.description.statuspub
dc.identifier.citationTomori, Françeska, Ansink, Erik, Houba, Harold, Hagerty, Nick, and Bos, Charles. 2024. “Market Power in California's Water Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106(3): 1274–1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ajae.12434
dc.identifier.essn1467-8276
dc.identifier.issn0002-9092
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133
dc.issue.number3
dc.journal.titleAmerican Journal of Agriculture Economics
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final1299
dc.page.initial1274
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-105982GB-I00/ES/REGLAS FISCALES Y REGULATORIAS PARA UN DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE/
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/BES-2017-080192/ES/DISEÑO DE INSTITUTIONES ECONOMICAS EN UNA ECONOMIA GLOBAL/
dc.relation.projectID2019PFR-URV-53
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelD43
dc.subject.jelQ25
dc.subject.keywordCalifornia
dc.subject.keywordMarket power
dc.subject.keywordNash-Cournot
dc.subject.keywordWater markets
dc.subject.ucmEconomía
dc.subject.ucmEconometría (Economía)
dc.subject.ucmEconomía pública
dc.subject.ucmEconomía industrial
dc.subject.unesco5307 Teoría Económica
dc.subject.unesco5302.02 Modelos Econométricos
dc.subject.unesco5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
dc.titleMarket power in California's water market
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dc.volume.number106
dspace.entity.typePublication

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