Market power in California's water market

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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434

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2023

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Wiley
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133

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Tomori, Françeska, Ansink, Erik, Houba, Harold, Hagerty, Nick, and Bos, Charles. 2024. “Market Power in California's Water Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106(3): 1274–1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434

Abstract

We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.

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Economía, Econometría (Economía), Economía pública, Economía industrial

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5307 Teoría Económica, 5302.02 Modelos Econométricos, 5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica

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