Some results on stability concepts for matching models

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Facultad de CC Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico
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We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.
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